Some behaviorists consider positivism to be an obsolete scientific philosophy and advocate for pragmatism or a tenet thereof, contextualism, as the appropriate philosophical world view for the study of behavior. I argue that pragmatism is just as flawed as positivism and for essentially the same reason: they both stem from the same source - British empiricism. I distinguish between empirical and empiricism, the former, the inductive experimental approach put forth by Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and exemplified in the work of B. F. Skinner; the latter, a problematic epistemology founded by John Locke (1632-1708) leading to ambiguity and confusion about the connection between sensation and material reality, and eventually to the proliferation of mentalistic/cognitive constructs that appear in the behavioral literature today. I also examine the ambivalent role of Ernst Mach’s philosophy of science, one that strongly influenced such notable scientists as Einstein and Skinner but also had the retrograde effect of establishing positivism as a school of philosophy. Finally, I argue that the term radical behaviorism should be replaced with behavioral materialism as the designation for the scientific philosophy underlying behaviorology, a philosophy that is aligned with scientific materialism, not with pragmatism or contextualism.

The internal structure and construct (convergent and discriminant) validity of the Russian-language version of the Attitudes about reality (AAR) scale developed by R. K. Unger, R. D. Draper and R. D., & M. L. Pendergrass (1986) are examined. The sample was 272 subjects. The confirmatory factor analysis revealed that both one-factor and three-factor structural models have poor fit indices. The exploratory factor analysis, in turn, did not allow to obtain an interpretable factor solution. The study also showed that the internal consistency of AARS is rather low. The obtained correlations do not confirm the convergent validity of the scale, although they provide initial support for its discriminant validity. The results show that the AAR scale in its current form is not suitable for assessing individual’s beliefs about reality.

This article discusses the problem of the relationship between the subjective assessment of sleep disorders and emotional and personal characteristics. After all, such features as anxiety, obsessive thoughts and actions, irritability, etc. can act as predictors of sleep disorders, at the same time, long enough sleep disorders can affect the psychological features to changes during life. The study sample included 20 people, of whom 6 were diagnosed with chronic primary insomnia, and 14 had subjective complaints about sleep. It was revealed that disturbance and poor quality of sleeping correlated with emotional-personal characteristics such as emotional instability, neuroticism, irritability, depression.

The paper presents the preliminary results of testing the relationship of tolerance of uncertainty, intolerance of uncertainty and interpersonal intolerance of uncertainty and personality traits on a sample of 87 people. A review of foreign studies on the relationship between these constructs is given. Revised NEO Personality Inventory [Orel, Senin, 2004] and the New Questionnaire of Tolerance of Uncertainty [Kornilova, 2010] was used in order to test the relationship between personality traits and tolerance of uncertainty, intolerance of uncertainty and interpersonal intolerance of uncertainty.

Whether dialogue is possible between different models describing formation autism spectrum disorders (ASD)? This problem is considered. Features of methodical bases and the corresponding terminology in the model of mind, approaches based on interpersonal interactions, model of sensory integration were compared. In addition to earlier described “through” phenomena connected with development of RAS (intolerance to uncertainty and deficiency of self-perception) the contribution of interpersonal attachment disturbances was described. The conclusion about ability to integrate approaches by consideration of basic phenomena in development of RAS is drawn.

The article deals with the study of human moral functioning in the framework of neurobiological and psychological research. Presents the views of John. Green and John. Haidt about the nature of moral judgments. Studies of the neurobiological mechanism of moral judgment do not explain their individual variability. This question relates to the subject of psychological research. The psychological concepts of morality of L. Kohlberg and D. Forsythe are compared. It is argued that the concept of ethical positions of Foresight has an advantage, since it considers the individual variability of moral judgments from metaethical positions. The analysis of neurobiological and psychological approaches to morality concluded that they did not represent the behavioral component of moral functioning.