Personal and Impersonal Moral Dilemmas: Explanatory Models and Distinction Criteria
https://doi.org/10.25205/2658-4506-2024-17-1-41-61
Abstract
The article considers the problem of classification of sacrificial moral dilemmas actively used in psychology and neurophysiology of moral reasoning. The origins and development of the opposition of personal and impersonal scenarios proposed within the framework of J. Greene’s dual process theory are analyzed, as well as alternative approaches, including the concept of universal moral grammar by J. Mikhail and models based on computational neuroscience. Particular attention is paid to the distinction criteria, their evolution and modern changes in approaches to the classification of dilemmas. The importance of further clarification of the classification parameters for increasing the validity of moral judgment studies is emphasized.
About the Author
A. P. Shabalin
Novosibirsk State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Alexey P. Shabalin, Senior Lecturer of the Section of Personality Psychology of the V. Zelman Institute for the Medicine and Psychology; Junior Researcher of the Center for Behavior Analysis
Scopus Author ID 57206893194
AuthorID RSCI 1002509
Novosibirsk
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Review
For citations:
Shabalin A.P. Personal and Impersonal Moral Dilemmas: Explanatory Models and Distinction Criteria. Reflexio. 2024;17(1):41-61. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25205/2658-4506-2024-17-1-41-61
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