reflexioReflexioReflexio2658-45062658-6894НГУ10.25205/2658-4506-2021-14-1-83-94reflexio-76Research ArticleПСИХОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯPSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCHДоступность моральных схем как основание спонтанных суждений о моральных качествахAvailability of Moral Schemas as a Basis for Spontaneous Judgments about Moral QualitiesШубадёроваЕ. Ю.ShubaderovaE. Y.

Екатерина Юрьевна Шубадёрова, бакалавр психологии

Новосибирск

Ekaterina Yu. Shubaderova, Bachelor of Psychology

Novosibirsk

e.shubaderova@g.nsu.ruПервушинаО. Н.PervushinaO. N.

Ольга Николаевна Первушина, кандидат психологических наук

Новосибирск

Scopus Author ID 57190754195RSCI AuthorID 406156

Olga N. Pervushina, Candidate of Sciences (Psychology)

NovosibirskScopus Author ID 57190754195RSCI AuthorID 406156

olgap7@yandex.ruНовосибирский государственный университетРоссияNovosibirsk State UniversityRussian Federation2021151120211418394Copyright © Шубадёрова Е.Ю., Первушина О.Н., 20212021Шубадёрова Е.Ю., Первушина О.Н.Shubaderova E.Y., Pervushina O.N.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://reflexio.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/76

Рассмотрены основные положения социально-когнитивного подхода, объясняющего моральную личность с точки зрения доступности когнитивных схем. Представлены результаты проверки экспериментальной модели Д. Нарваэс, Д. Лапсли, С. Хагель и Б. Ласки на российской выборке. Был использован метод первичного вывода черт, чтобы выяснить, будут ли люди с доступностью моральных схем делать спонтанные выводы о моральных качествах с большей вероятностью, чем люди с доступностью других типов схем. Полученные результаты исследования совпали с результатами Д. Нарваэс с соавторами в том, что доступность моральных конструкций влияет на обработку социальной информации. Люди с большей доступностью моральных схем делали спонтанные выводы о моральных качествах с большей вероятностью, чем люди, в большей степени ориентирующиеся на другие когнитивные схемы.

Basic ideas of socio-cognitive approach are considered. This approach explains the moral personality from the viewpoint of availability of cognitive schemas. The results of testing the experimental model of D. Narvaez, D. Lapsley, S. Hagele and B. Lasky on Russian sample are presented. Primary trait inference method was used to determine if people with availability of moral schemas were more likely to make spontaneous inferences about moral qualities than people with availability of other types of schemas. The obtained results of the study coincided with the results of D. Narvaez et al. in conclusion that availability of moral constructions affects the processing of social information. People with a greater availability of moral schemas were more likely to make spontaneous inferences about moral qualities than people more oriented on other cognitive schemas.

доступность моральных схемсоциально-когнитивный подходобработка социальной информацииморальная личностьморальная идентичностьморальное развитиеavailability of moral schemaschronic accessibilitymoral chronicitysocial-cognitivesocial information processingmoral personalitymoral schemasmoral identitymoral development.ReferencesBargh J. A. (1989). Conditional automaticity: Varieties of automatic influence in social perception and cignition. In: J. S. Uleman, & J. A. Bargh (Eds.). Unintended thought (pp. 3–51). New York: Guilford.Bargh J. A. (1989). Conditional automaticity: Varieties of automatic influence in social perception and cignition. In: J. S. Uleman, & J. A. Bargh (Eds.). Unintended thought (pp. 3–51). New York: Guilford.Bargh, J. A., Lombardi, W., & Higgins, E. T. (1988). Automaticity of chronically accessible constructs in Person Situation effects on person perception: It's just a matter of time. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 599–605.Bargh, J. 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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.