reflexioReflexioReflexio2658-45062658-6894НГУ10.25205/2658-4506-2024-17-1-41-61reflexio-128Research ArticleТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКАЯ ПСИХОЛОГИЯTHEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGYЛичностные и безличные моральные дилеммы: объяснительные модели и критерии разграниченияPersonal and Impersonal Moral Dilemmas: Explanatory Models and Distinction CriteriaШабалинА. П.ShabalinA. P.

Шабалин Алексей Павлович, старший преподаватель кафедры психологии личности Института медицины и психологии им. Зельмана; младший научный сотрудник Междисциплинарного центра прикладного анализа поведения ИМПЗ НГУ 

Scopus Author ID 57206893194

AuthorID RSCI 1002509

Новосибирск

Alexey P. Shabalin, Senior Lecturer of the Section of Personality Psychology of the V. Zelman Institute for the Medicine and Psychology; Junior Researcher of the Center for Behavior Analysis

Scopus Author ID 57206893194

AuthorID RSCI 1002509

Novosibirsk

a.shabalin3@g.nsu.ruНовосибирский государственный университетРоссияNovosibirsk State UniversityRussian Federation2024251020251714161Copyright © Шабалин А.П., 20252025Шабалин А.П.Shabalin A.P.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://reflexio.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/128

В статье рассматривается проблема классификации жертвенных моральных дилемм, активно используемых в психологии и нейрофизиологии морального выбора. Анализируются истоки и развитие противопоставления личностных и безличных сценариев, предложенное в рамках теории двойного процесса Дж. Грина, а также альтернативные подходы, включая концепцию универсальной моральной грамматики Дж. Михаила и модели, основанные на вычислительной нейронауке. Особое внимание уделяется критериям разграничения, их эволюции и современным изменениям в подходах к классификации дилемм. Подчеркивается важность дальнейшего уточнения параметров классификации для повышения валидности исследований морального суждения.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.